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TRUE BELIEF: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF 
“KNOWLEDGE” IN THE WASHINGTON CRIMINAL 
CODE 
Alan R. Hancock
*
 
INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Allen,
1
 the Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed 
State v. Shipp,
2
 holding that in order for a defendant to have 
“knowledge” for purposes of the Washington Criminal Code, the 
defendant must have actual, subjective knowledge of the fact in issue.
3
 
However, glaring problems still remain with the statutory definition of 
the term “knowledge.” 
The Criminal Code defines “knowledge” in two alternative ways. The 
first prong states that a person knows or acts knowingly or with 
knowledge when “he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or 
result described by a statute defining an offense.”4 The second prong of 
the definition states that a person knows or acts knowingly or with 
knowledge when “he or she has information which would lead a 
reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which 
facts are described by a statute defining an offense.”5 
Consider, for example, the crime of possessing stolen property.
6
 The 
term “possessing stolen property” is defined as “knowingly to receive, 
retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has 
been stolen and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any 
person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto.”7 Thus, one 
                                                     
* Alan R. Hancock is a Washington State Superior Court Judge for Island County. He received his 
Bachelor of Arts degree, magna cum laude, from Western Washington University (1973), where he 
majored in Philosophy, and received his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Washington 
School of Law (1976). 
1.  182 Wash. 2d 364, 341 P.3d 268 (2015). 
2.  93 Wash. 2d 510, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980). 
3.  See Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374, 341 P.3d at 273. 
4.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i) (2014 & Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). 
5.  Id. § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). 
6.  This crime may be committed in any of three different degrees. See id. §§ 9A.56.150–.170. 
7.  Id. § 9A.56.140(1). 
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of the elements of the crime is that the defendant must “know” that the 
property has been stolen. Under the first prong of the definition of 
“knowledge,” the defendant could be found to have such “knowledge” 
only if he or she had actual awareness of the fact that the property was 
stolen. But under the second prong of the definition, the defendant could 
seemingly be found to have such “knowledge” if he or she had 
information that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to 
believe that the property was stolen, even though he or she had no actual 
awareness that the property was stolen. 
Read literally, the second prong of the statutory definition of 
“knowledge” in the Criminal Code is unconstitutional; it violates the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not 
provide citizens with adequate notice of what the law requires.
8
 
However, to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional on its face, the 
Washington State Supreme Court interpreted this statute to mean that it 
permits, but does not direct, the finder of fact “to find that the defendant 
had knowledge if it finds that the ordinary person would have had 
knowledge under the circumstances. The jury must still be allowed to 
conclude that he [or she] was less attentive or intelligent than the 
ordinary person.”9 In any case, the finder of fact “must still find 
subjective knowledge.”10 Despite the holdings in Shipp and Allen, other 
case law and the pattern jury instruction defining “knowledge” still 
literally permit the jury to find the defendant guilty based on 
constructive knowledge. 
There is a related problem connected with the definition of 
“knowledge.” The Washington State Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant can be found to have “knowledge” even though the supposed 
“fact” that he or she “knew” was not even true.11 This is directly 
contrary to the definition,
12
 which requires awareness of a fact, which by 
definition is a proposition that is true. 
Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that a criminal defendant can 
currently be found to have acted with knowledge, and therefore be found 
guilty of a crime, even though the defendant had no awareness of the 
fact he or she allegedly knew, and even though the “fact” he or she 
                                                     
8.  See Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374, 341 P.3d at 273; State v. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d 510, 513–16, 
610 P.2d 1322, 1324–26 (1980).  
9.  Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326. 
10.  Id. at 517, 610 P.2d at 1326 (emphasis added); see also Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374–75, 341 
P.3d at 273. 
11.  State v. Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d 167, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992). 
12.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1). 
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supposedly “knew” was not even true. This is untenable; the law must 
change. 
The Legislature should amend the statute defining “knowledge” to 
eliminate the second prong of the definition. The second prong adds 
nothing useful to the first prong of the definition, and only causes 
confusion. The case law construing the statute has only added to the 
confusion. In addition, or in the alternative, the Washington Pattern Jury 
Instruction Committee should amend Criminal Washington Pattern Jury 
Instruction (WPIC) § 10.02 to eliminate the second prong of the 
definition. 
I. THE SECOND PRONG OF WASHINGTON’S DEFINITION OF 
“KNOWLEDGE” SETS FORTH AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD 
What is knowledge? In epistemological circles, knowledge is 
generally defined as justified true belief.
13
 In other words, in order for a 
person to have knowledge of a given proposition, the proposition must 
be true, the person must believe it to be true, and the person must be 
justified in believing it to be true.
14
 
The first prong of the definition of “knowledge” in the Criminal Code 
appears to define knowledge in terms of true belief, without any 
reference to what we might call justification for such true belief.
15
 It 
states that “[a] person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge 
when: (i) he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result 
described by a statute defining an offense.”16 This definition uses the 
term awareness rather than belief, and this is a reasonable synonym 
under the circumstances. Awareness connotes perception and 
consciousness, and certainly implies belief. The definition refers to 
awareness of a fact, facts, or circumstances. These terms necessarily 
                                                     
13.  See, e.g., RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 5–23 (1966). Chisholm 
formulates the elements of knowledge as follows: “S knows at t that h is true, provided: (1) S 
believes h at t; (2) h is true; and (3) h is evident at t for S.” Id. at 23. The term “evident” is a term of 
art in this context, which Chisholm explains in detail. It is roughly equivalent to the concept of 
being justified in one’s true belief. 
14.  In a famous paper, the philosopher Edmund L. Gettier III showed, by way of some ingenious 
counterexamples, that a person can have justified true belief of a proposition, and still not have 
knowledge of that proposition. Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 
ANALYSIS 121 (1963). Still, as a rule of thumb, justified true belief is a good working definition of 
knowledge. Chisholm adds a qualification to his definition of “knowledge” in order to account for 
Gettier’s point. CHISHOLM, supra note 13, at 23. 
15.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i). 
16.  Id.  
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imply the truth of the proposition the person is aware of. A fact by 
definition is something that is true.
17
 
When we turn to the second prong of the definition of “knowledge,” 
however, we encounter a definition that is not only contrary to an 
ordinary understanding of the concept of knowledge, but also contrary to 
well-established principles of criminal law. The second prong of the 
definition of “knowledge” is as follows: 
A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when: 
. . .  
(ii) he or she has information which would lead a reasonable 
person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which 
facts are described by a statute defining an offense.
18
 
This reasonable person standard was part of the original Washington 
Criminal Code, Title 9A of the Revised Code of Washington, enacted in 
1975, to become effective in 1976.
19
 The Criminal Code was a 
combination of a revised criminal code prepared by the Judiciary 
Committee of the Washington Legislative Council, which drew on the 
Model Penal Code,
20
 and a criminal code drafted by the Washington 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.
21
 
The Model Penal Code defines the term “knowingly” as follows: 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of 
an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his [or her] conduct or 
the attendant circumstances, he [or she] is aware that his [or her] 
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his [or her] conduct, he [or 
she] is aware that it is practically certain that his [or her] conduct 
will cause such a result.
22
 
Both parts of this definition are consistent with the ordinary 
understanding of the term “knowledge,” in that they both refer to the 
person’s awareness of the person’s conduct, the attendant circumstances, 
                                                     
17.  It was not unreasonable for the Legislature to exclude any consideration of justification for 
the actor’s awareness of facts in defining “knowledge.” After all, the focus of the criminal law is on 
the state of mind of the actor, as well as the acts of the actor. 
18.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). 
19.  An Act Relating to Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 1975 Wash. Sess. Laws 826. 
20.  See MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
21.  See Recent Developments, Criminal Law—Affirmative Defenses in the Washington Criminal 
Code—The Impact of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), 51 WASH. L. REV. 953, 954–55 
n.10 (1976).  
22.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b). 
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or the result of the person’s conduct, as the case may be, which roughly 
equates to true belief.
23
 The definition also avoids any concept of 
constructive knowledge.
24
 
In stark contrast, the second prong of the definition of “knowledge” in 
the Washington Criminal Code essentially sets forth a negligence 
standard for determining whether a person has knowledge of a given 
fact. Civil Washington Pattern Jury Instruction § 10.01 sets forth the 
most common legal definition of negligence: 
Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. It is the doing 
of some act that a reasonably careful person would not do under 
the same or similar circumstances or the failure to do some act 
that a reasonably careful person would have done under the 
same or similar circumstances.
25
 
There is a striking similarity between the definition of “negligence” 
and the second prong of the definition of “knowledge.” Consider, for 
example, a situation in which a defendant is charged with possessing 
stolen property.
26
 One of the elements of this crime is that the defendant 
“knew” that the property he or she possessed had been stolen.27 Under 
the second prong of the definition of “knowledge,” the defendant could 
be held to have such knowledge if he or she had information that would 
lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that the 
property had been stolen.
28
 Under these circumstances, the defendant has 
acted negligently, i.e., he or she has failed to become aware of the fact 
that the property had been stolen; a reasonably careful person would 
have become aware of this fact. 
A. The Washington Courts Have Held that “Knowledge” Requires  
Actual Knowledge; Constructive Knowledge Is Insufficient 
Shipp and Allen address the legal defect in the second prong of the 
definition of “knowledge.” Three cases were consolidated for hearing 
                                                     
23.  As previously noted, it would not be necessary to include the concept of justification in a 
criminal code definition of “knowledge.” 
24.  In the law, “constructive knowledge” is generally understood to be knowledge imputed to a 
person who should have been aware of a fact if the person had exercised reasonable care. See, e.g., 
Constructive knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (9th ed. 2009).  
25.  6 WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 10.01 (2014) (emphasis added). 
26.  This crime may be committed in any of three different degrees. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 
9A.56.150–.170 (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
27.  Id. § 9A.56.140(1) (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
28.  Id. § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii). 
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before the Supreme Court in Shipp.
29
 In two of these cases, the issue was 
whether a jury instruction tracking the language of the second prong of 
the definition of “knowledge” was lawful and constitutional.30 The Court 
held that such an instruction is not lawful and constitutional because it 
redefines the accepted meaning of the term “knowledge” to mean 
negligent ignorance: “[t]he ordinary person reading one of the criminal 
statutes would surely be misled if the statute defining knowledge were 
interpreted to effect such a drastic change in meaning.”31 The Court’s 
citations indicate that it was basing this ruling on the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
32
 The Court remanded these two cases 
for new trials.
33
 Shipp mandates that different jury instructions must be 
given. 
As the Court pointed out in Shipp: “[k]nowledge is intended to be a 
more culpable mental state than recklessness, which is a subjective 
standard, rather than the equivalent of negligence, which is an objective 
standard.”34 Thus, if the jury is permitted to find that the defendant acted 
knowingly if “he or she has information which would lead a reasonable 
person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are 
described by a statute defining an offense,”35 the jury would, in effect, be 
permitted to find knowledge if it finds the defendant negligent in not 
being aware of the relevant fact or facts. This is unacceptable because 
acting with mere negligence is not sufficient to establish criminal 
liability.
36
 Even the definition of “criminal negligence” provides that the 
actor’s failure to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may 
occur must constitute “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.”37 
                                                     
29.  State v. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d 510, 512, 610 P.2d 1332, 1324 (1980).  
30.  Id. at 512–13, 610 P.2d at 1324. 
31.  Id. at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326.  
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. at 517, 610 P.2d at 1326.  
34.  Id. at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325.  
35.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
36.  Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 515–16, 610 P.2d at 1325–26. Compare 6 WASH. PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 10.01 (2014) (“Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. It is the 
doing of some act that a reasonably careful person would not do under the same or similar 
circumstances or the failure to do some act that a reasonably careful person would have done under 
the same or similar circumstances.”), with 11 WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 
§ 10.04 (2014) (“A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she 
fails to be aware of a substantial risk that may occur and this failure constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.”). 
37.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(d) (emphasis added). 
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In Shipp, the Court correctly recognized the aforementioned problems 
with the second prong of the definition of “knowledge.”38 First, it 
rejected any interpretation of this definition that would require the jury 
to follow a mandatory presumption that knowledge exists where a 
reasonable person in the same situation would have knowledge.
39
 
Second, it rejected any interpretation that would permit the jury to find 
knowledge based on the reasonable person standard if the jury believed 
that the defendant “was so unperceptive or inattentive that [the 
defendant] did not have knowledge in the ordinary sense.”40 The Court 
pointed out that this second interpretation “redefines knowledge with an 
objective standard which is the equivalent of negligent ignorance,” a 
redefinition that is “inconsistent with the statutory scheme which creates 
a hierarchy of mental states for crimes of increasing culpability.”41 
However, the Court salvaged the legality of the second prong of the 
definition of “knowledge.” The Court held that 
the statute must be interpreted as only permitting, rather than 
directing, the jury to find that the defendant had knowledge if it 
finds that the ordinary person would have had knowledge under 
the circumstances. The jury must still be allowed to conclude 
that [the defendant] was less attentive or intelligent than the 
ordinary person.
42
 
The Court further pointed out that “[t]he jury must still find subjective 
knowledge.”43 
Allen underscores the problematic language of the second prong of 
the “knowledge” definition.44 In that case, the Court reaffirmed that “the 
State was required to prove that Allen actually knew that he was 
promoting or facilitating Clemmons [the principal in the murder of four 
Lakewood police officers] in the commission of first degree 
                                                     
38.  Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325. 
39.  Id. at 514, 610 P.2d at 1325. 
40.  Id. The Shipp Court referred to what it called “subjective knowledge,” and clearly intended 
this to mean actual knowledge in the sense that the person with knowledge believed, or was aware 
of, the fact, facts, or circumstances or result in question. Id. at 513–17. Actual or subjective 
knowledge is to be distinguished from constructive knowledge, i.e., knowledge imputed to a person 
who should have been aware of a fact if the person had exercised reasonable care. See supra note 
24. In this sense, the second prong of the statutory definition can be characterized as a definition of 
constructive knowledge, as the Court noted in Allen. State v. Allen, 182 Wash. 2d 364, 374, 341 
P.3d 268, 273 (2015). 
41.  Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325. 
42.  Id. at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326. 
43.  Id. at 517, 610 P.2d at 1326 (emphasis added). 
44.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
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premeditated murder.”45 The Court correctly cited Shipp for this 
proposition.
46
 One of the issues in Allen was whether the prosecutor had 
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument by misstating 
the “knowledge” standard upon which the jury could convict the 
defendant. The Court held that the prosecutor had done so by repeatedly 
arguing “that the jury could convict Allen if it found that he should have 
known Clemmons was going to murder the four police officers.”47 
While the Court reached the correct result in Allen, it did not directly 
address the highly problematic language of the second prong of the 
definition of “knowledge.” And it added to the confusion by stating: 
While the State must prove actual knowledge, it may do so 
through circumstantial evidence. Thus, Washington’s culpability 
statute provides that a person has actual knowledge when “he or 
she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the 
same situation to believe” that he was promoting or facilitating 
the crime eventually charged.
48
 
Therein lies one of the problems addressed in this Article. This statute 
(the second prong of the definition of “knowledge”) states on its face 
that the jury can find actual knowledge based on constructive 
knowledge, and that is unconstitutional, as previously explained. 
B. The Criminal Washington Pattern Jury Instruction Does Not 
Remedy the Problem 
The WPIC does nothing to remedy this glaring problem. WPIC 
§ 10.02 now states the second prong of the definition of “knowledge” as 
follows: “[i]f a person has information that would lead a reasonable 
person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is 
permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of 
that fact.”49 
                                                     
45.  Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374, 341 P.3d at 273 (emphasis in original). 
46.  Id. While correctly citing Shipp, the Court misstated the nature of the case in its parenthetical 
description of the case: “[a]ccomplice must have actual knowledge that principal was engaging in 
the crime eventually charged.” Id. (citing Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 517, 610 P.2d at 1322). Shipp did 
not involve accomplice liability. Rather, three cases were consolidated for hearing in Shipp. They 
involved convictions for (1) knowingly promoting prostitution in both the first and second degrees, 
(2) knowingly riding in a stolen car, and (3) attempted rape in the second degree and knowing 
assault with intent to commit rape (second-degree assault). Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 512–13, 610 P.2d 
at 1324. 
47.  Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374, 341 P.3d at 273 (emphasis in original). 
48.  Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii)). 
49.  11 WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 10.02 (2014) (emphasis added). 
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This instruction essentially states that the jury can find that a person 
acted with knowledge of a fact if that person has information that would 
lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that that fact 
exists. But that is the very thing that Shipp and Allen hold to be 
impermissible, and therefore this instruction does not solve the problem 
addressed in those cases. Taken literally, the WPIC instruction does 
exactly what these cases, and any ordinary and commonsense 
understanding of the concept of knowledge, say cannot be done. The 
instruction allows the jury to find knowledge based on a constructive 
knowledge (reasonable person) standard even if the jury does not find 
that the defendant acted with actual or subjective knowledge. It does not 
say anything about the fact that the jury is required to find actual or 
subjective knowledge. 
In State v. Leech,
50
 the Washington State Supreme Court held that the 
WPIC instruction is consistent with Shipp.
51
 Nevertheless, the holding of 
Leech is highly problematic. Neither Leech nor any of the other cases 
explains how its holding squares with Shipp, and it does not, in fact, 
square with Shipp. The Leech Court never addressed the fact that the 
State must prove that the defendant had actual, subjective knowledge of 
the fact in question in order to prove the element of knowledge. 
This problem can be traced, in part, to a logical fallacy first 
introduced into this body of law in State v. Davis.
52
 In that case, the 
court of appeals affirmed the use of WPIC § 10.02 as it describes the 
second prong of the definition of “knowledge.” The court held that 
WPIC § 10.02 complies with Shipp, and stated “[c]ontrary to 
defendant’s assertion, the instruction allowed the jury to consider the 
subjective intelligence or mental condition of the defendant.”53 But the 
fact that the instruction allows the jury to consider the subjective 
intelligence or mental condition of the defendant is not the problem. The 
problem is that in order to find knowledge, the jury must find subjective 
knowledge. Regrettably, WPIC § 10.02 also allows the jury not to 
consider the subjective knowledge of the defendant, and this is clearly 
contrary to Shipp and Allen. 
                                                     
50.  114 Wash. 2d 700, 790 P.2d 160 (1990). 
51.  Id. at 710, 790 P.2d at 165. In addition, the Leech Court cites numerous other cases 
upholding the WPIC instruction as constitutional. Id. at 710 n.20, 790 P.2d at 165 n.20. The Leech 
Court states, without any meaningful analysis, that the trial court’s definition of knowledge 
instruction in WPIC § 10.02 “avoids the due process problem identified in Shipp; it was not 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 710, 790 P.2d at 165. 
52.  39 Wash. App. 916, 696 P.2d 627 (1985). 
53.  Id. at 919–20, 696 P.2d at 629 (emphasis added). 
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The fallacy in Davis is perpetuated in the other cases cited by the 
Washington State Supreme Court in footnote twenty of the Leech 
opinion,
54
 and has become entrenched in the law. It is time to call a halt 
to any further use of this faulty reasoning. The defects in the second 
prong of the definition of “knowledge”55 and WPIC § 10.02, as outlined 
in this Article, can lead to unjust and unconstitutional convictions. Jurors 
reading the instruction literally can reasonably conclude that they are 
permitted to find that the defendant acted knowingly if a reasonable 
person would have acted knowingly under the circumstances. In the 
absence of an improper closing argument by the prosecutor explicitly 
stating that the jury can find knowledge based on this objective standard, 
as happened in Allen, there is no remedy for a conviction based on such 
a result under current case law. 
II. ONE CANNOT KNOW A FALSE PROPOSITION EVEN IF 
ONE BELIEVES THE PROPOSITION TO BE TRUE 
We have seen that the second prong of the definition of “knowledge” 
in the Criminal Code is defective on its face, and has led to erroneous 
legal reasoning. As outlined above, the Washington cases do not give 
proper attention to the requirement that a defendant have actual, 
subjective knowledge in order to be convicted of a crime in which 
“knowledge” is an element. It is not enough that a reasonable person in 
the same situation as the defendant would have had such actual 
knowledge. The WPIC on the definition of “knowledge” does not 
remedy this problem. 
The second prong of the definition of “knowledge” has led to other 
problems as well. In State v. Johnson,
56
 the State charged the defendant 
with the crime of promoting prostitution. The Washington Criminal 
Code defines this crime as follows: “[a] person is guilty of promoting 
prostitution if, having possession or control of premises which he or she 
knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he or she fails without 
lawful excuse to make reasonable effort to halt or abate such use.”57 The 
Washington State Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s conviction for 
promoting prostitution, holding that the defendant knowingly allowed 
her premises to be used for prostitution purposes, even though the 
premises in question were not actually being used for prostitution 
                                                     
54.  Leech, 114 Wash. 2d at 710, 790 P.2d at 165. 
55.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
56.  119 Wash. 2d 167, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992). 
57.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.090(1) (emphasis added). 
Hancock_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/7/2016  4:57 PM 
2016] TRUE BELIEF 187 
 
purposes.
58
 Rather, the defendant had been arrested pursuant to a sting 
operation in which undercover police officers posed as prostitute and 
patron.
59
 
The Johnson Court cited the second prong of the definition of 
“knowledge,” and stated that “the Legislature has chosen to define 
knowledge so that one may ‘know’ something based upon a reasonable, 
subjective belief that a fact exists.”60 In response to the defendant’s 
argument that one’s mistaken, reasonable, subjective belief is akin to an 
impermissible constructive knowledge standard invalidated in Shipp, the 
Court stated that “Shipp understood that actual knowledge included 
one’s subjective belief,”61 and that the “fact that one’s subjective belief 
may be inaccurate is not equivalent to a presumption of knowledge.”62 
The Court concluded: 
Shipp held that there cannot be a mandatory presumption of 
knowledge based upon one’s receipt of certain information 
because it would not allow a jury to take into account the 
subjective intelligence or mental condition of the defendant. 
Shipp, however, does permit a jury to find actual knowledge 
from a subjective belief based on circumstantial evidence. It is 
the defendant’s subjective belief that is important for culpability, 
not the objective state of facts. The jury is permitted to find 
actual subjective knowledge if there is sufficient information 
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a fact 
exists. Therefore, a mistaken reasonable, subjective belief may 
constitute “knowledge” without violating Shipp.63 
The Court is correct in stating that a jury is permitted to find actual 
knowledge based on circumstantial evidence, and that it is the 
defendant’s subjective belief that is important for culpability, at least to 
the extent that the defendant must subjectively believe that the fact in 
question exists. But the remainder of the Court’s analysis is erroneous.64 
First, the Court misconstrues the holding in Shipp, as other courts have 
done, in stating that the jury is permitted to find actual subjective 
knowledge if there is sufficient information which would lead a 
                                                     
58.  Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d at 174, 829 P.2d at 1085. 
59.  Id. at 169, 829 P.2d at 1083. 
60.  Id. at 174, 829 P.2d at 1085. 
61.  Id. (citing State v. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d 510, 517, 610 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1980)). 
62.  Id. at 174, 829 P.2d at 1085. 
63.  Id. at 174, 829 P.2d at 1805–86 (emphasis in original). 
64.  Only one member of the Washington State Supreme Court that decided Johnson remains on 
the Court today, Justice Charles W. Johnson. Justice Johnson correctly dissented in Johnson. 
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reasonable person to believe that a fact exists.
65
 As previously explained, 
Shipp holds that the jury must find that the defendant had actual, 
subjective knowledge in order to find that he or she acted with 
knowledge. 
Second, the Court introduces a new fallacy into the discussion by 
stating that a mistaken reasonable subjective belief can result in 
culpability.
66
 On the contrary, the definition of “knowledge” requires 
awareness of a “fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a 
statute defining an offense.”67 One cannot have knowledge for purposes 
of the Criminal Code unless one is aware of a fact. If a person has a 
mistaken belief concerning a supposed fact, then by definition, the 
person does not have knowledge. This is also consistent with the 
ordinary meaning of the term “knowledge” as (justified) true belief.68 
The Court in Johnson waxed philosophical in its reasoning, citing an 
example in which a person can reasonably believe that by flicking a light 
switch, the light will come on. Yet, if there is a fault in the wiring, the 
light will not come on.
69
 The Court stated that under these 
circumstances, “we believe or subjectively ‘know’ the switch will turn 
the lights on even though it is objectively impossible, until we obtain 
information that the wiring is faulty, i.e., by flicking the switch and the 
lights remain off.”70 The Court’s quotation marks around the word 
“know” are telling. We do not, in fact, know something just because we 
reasonably believe it to be the case. In order to have knowledge, the fact 
we purport to know must be true. More to the point of this Article, the 
definition of “knowledge” in the Criminal Code requires awareness of a 
fact, not what someone believes to be a fact. The Johnson case is yet 
another instance in which the second prong of the definition of 
“knowledge” has led to erroneous reasoning and, in that case at least, a 
                                                     
65.  See, e.g., Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d at 174, 829 P.2d at 1085–86. 
66.  See id. at 174, 829 P.2d at 1086. 
67.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i) (2014 & Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). 
68.  To be charitable, perhaps one interpretation of the court’s reasoning is that under the second 
prong of the definition of “knowledge,” a reasonable person could believe that the relevant facts 
exist, even though they did not exist and the person’s belief was mistaken, and still have knowledge. 
Any such interpretation would be erroneous, however. The first prong of the definition of 
“knowledge” clearly requires awareness of an actual fact, and the two parts of the statute must 
considered as a whole, with all its provisions considered in relation to one another. See State v. 
Bunker, 169 Wash. 2d 571, 578, 238 P.3d 487, 491 (2010). Moreover, even assuming, for the sake 
of argument, that the statute is ambiguous in this regard, any such interpretation would violate the 
rule of lenity. See, e.g., State v. McGee, 122 Wash. 2d 783, 787, 864 P.2d 912, 913–14 (1993). 
69.  Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d at 173, 829 P.2d at 1086. 
70.  Id. 
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wrongful conviction.
71
 
III. THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD REPEAL THE SECOND 
PRONG OF “KNOWLEDGE,” AND THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE SHOULD AMEND THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION 
Voltaire once said that the “the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, 
nor Roman, nor an empire.”72 By the same token, the longstanding 
definition of “knowledge” is (justified) true belief. But under current 
Washington case law and the pattern jury instruction defining the second 
prong of “knowledge,” a defendant can be held to have knowledge of a 
given fact (1) even though he or she did not believe the fact to be true,
73
 
and (2) even though the supposed “fact” was not even true!74 This flies 
in the face of the first prong of the definition of “knowledge” set forth in 
the Washington Criminal Code,
75
 fundamental constitutional principles 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as they 
relate to the second prong of the definition of “knowledge,”76 and the 
common understanding of the concept of “knowledge” generally. It is 
not too much to ask that the law, and particularly the criminal law where 
liberty is at stake, be logical and reasonable. 
The Legislature should remedy these problems by eliminating the 
second prong of the definition of “knowledge” in the Criminal Code 
altogether. After all, what is wrong with defining “knowledge” in 
accordance with the first prong of the definition? As is constitutionally 
required, this definition simply requires that the defendant have 
awareness of the fact in question (true belief) in order to have 
knowledge. There is nothing to be gained by adding a second definition 
that talks about what a reasonable person might believe about a fact in 
question. In order for any such second definition to be constitutional, it 
would have to make reference in some manner to the fact that the 
                                                     
71.  Even though the defendant could not properly have been convicted of promoting prostitution 
under the facts in Johnson, she could have been charged with and convicted of attempted promoting 
prostitution. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.28.020(2) (“If the conduct in which a person engages 
otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime, it is no defense to a prosecution of such attempt 
that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or 
legally impossible of commission.”). 
72.  OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 716 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
73.  See supra Section I.A. 
74.  See supra Part II. 
75.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i). 
76.  Id. § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii). 
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defendant must still have actual, subjective knowledge, which is 
required in the first definition anyway. 
Even if the Legislature does not repeal the second prong of the 
definition of “knowledge,” the Washington Supreme Court Committee 
on Jury Instructions should amend WPIC § 10.02 to eliminate the 
second paragraph thereof, which makes reference to the unconstitutional 
reasonable person standard in defining “knowledge,” or else amend it to 
include a requirement that the defendant must in any event act with 
actual, subjective knowledge. The Washington State Supreme Court 
should also reexamine, in an appropriate case, State v. Leech, State v. 
Johnson, and other problematic cases to rectify these problems. 
CONCLUSION 
The second prong of the definition of “knowledge” in Washington’s 
Criminal Code sets forth an unconstitutional negligence standard.  WPIC 
§ 10.02 further complicates the problem.  The Legislature should repeal 
the second prong of the definition of “knowledge” in the Criminal Code. 
Absent such a repeal, the jury instructions committee should amend 
WPIC § 10.02 to eliminate the potential for juries to find “knowledge” 
based on constructive knowledge. Until this happens, there is a 
substantial risk that juries will wrongly find defendants guilty of crimes 
based on constructive knowledge, rather than based on their true belief, 
as constitutionally required. 
 
